Beginning the Iraqi pullout

U.S. combat troops have pulled out of Iraqi cities (some trainers remain), the first step toward what is scheduled to be a complete U.S. military withdrawal. The Register thinks it's been a lot more pain than gain, and hopes the people are more skeptical the next time some yahoo in government wants to start a war of choice.

Iraq war still a mistake

I've got to give Francis Fukuyama a little credit for taking a sensible position and sticking to it, and for the Wall Street Journal, which has been consistently pro-war and absurdly belligerent about almost every international issue, for printing his column. A few weeks ago he paid the Journal's Bret Stephens $100 on a wager that Iraq would be a "mess" five years from 2003. He concedes that Iraq is in better shape than a year ago and in better shape than almost anybody really expected. However:

"What I absolutely did not concede, however, was the fact that this change meant the war itself was worth it. By invading Iraq in the manner it did, the U.S. exacerbated all of the threats it faced prior to 2003. Recruitment into terrorist cells shot up all over the world. North Korea and Iran accelerated their development of nuclear weapons." And Iran is now the dominant player in the Persian Gulf region.

Fukuyama also explains, beyond the psychological reluctance, why so many war opponents are so reluctant to concede that the "surge" has "worked" -- beyond the obvious fact that other factors, including the Anbar Awakening beginning before the surge and Muqtada al-Sadr getting word from Iran to enter a cease-fire were involved. As Fukuyama puts it, "The smallest concession induces supporters of the war to argue that they were right all along, as Mr. Stephens did." This war may end without the result being indefinite occupation and a complete mess in Iraq. But it was still unnecessary and unwise.

Another inadequate reason for war

The investment of some people with claims to expertise in the Iraq war means that however inept the administration itself might be at justifying the war, there is a ready coterie of writers eager to come up with rationales. Of course, this means that the stated justifications for war among the chattering classes keep changing, but that doesn't bother the true believers. Any novelty will do.

One of the latest to come up with yet another "real" reason the United States government, or to be a little more pinpoint, George W. Bush, started this conflict is Fouad Ajami, writing for the reliably pro-war Wall Street Journal. In his op-ed piece, he claims it was really a war of deterrence:

The country was "gripped by legitimate concern over gathering dangers in the aftermath of 9/11. Kabul and the war against the Taliban had not sufficed. A war of deterrence had to be waged against Arab radicalism, and Saddam Hussein had drawn the short straw. He had not ducked, he had not scurried for cover. He openly mocked America's grief, taunted its power."

We had to go to war because a small-time thug was -- gasp!! -- taunting us? Is the world a fourth-grade schoolyard? Well, Ajami claims, there was more to it:

"We don't need to overwork the stereotype that Arabs understand and respond to the logic of force, but this is a region sensitive to the wind, and to the will of outside powers. Before America struck into Iraq, a mere 18 months after 9/11, there had been glee in the Arab world, a sense that America had gotten its comeuppance. There were regimes hunkering down, feigning friendship with America while aiding and abetting the forces of terror."

Leave aside the easy imputation of unanimity to the "Arab world." Ajami doesn't name the regimes. Maybe Saudi Arabia, still maintaining its "special relationship," fits the bill, but never mind. Suppose several regimes were secretly abetting terrorists. Does that justify starting a war of aggression, which the Iraq war most definitely was? Does it make the war one of "necessity," as Ajami retrospectively wants to make it? Was the only other choice to give the aggressor (presumaby he means al-Qaida) "what he seeks"? Did making Iraq an example make the other Arab countries trust us more, or desire more strongly to be allied with the U.S.?

Even under Ajami's late-blooming justification, this was what international law theorists call a "preventive" war as distinguished from a "preemptive" war. A preemptive war is started when an enemy has signaled an intention to begin hostilities imminently, e.g, by massing troops on the border or activating pilots. A preventive war is waged to prevent a problem or hostility that might (or might not) materialize somewhere down the road, years or even decades away. International law theorists view it as unjustified, as an act of aggression. The U.S. used to claim it only engaged in wars to deter or punish aggression, that were always attacked first. However truthful that was, the administration and its apologists don't bother with that justification anymore. We can start wars because people are taunting and deceiving us, and might actually do something concrete sometime. We're the world's policeman, and we don't have a Fourth Amendment to keep us in line. But empires pay for their arrogance eventually.

McClellan seems remarkably credible

This is a preliminary impression, of course. I haven't read the book yet, though there's a good chance I'll have a copy tomorrow. But I watched the Scott McClellan interview with Keith Olberman tonight, and he seemed pretty credible, in the sense that he seemed to stick to what he had reason to know about and to resist speculating on what he didn't or couldn't know about. I'll have more to say later.

I still think he wasn't much of a press secretary, especially in the sense that he wasn't especially good at communicating what the administration was trying to do. I guess I'm not surprised it took him so long to get disillusioned; loyalists can often overlook vague and growing uneasiness for a long time. My preliminary impression, however, is that he did the book for what he conceives to be patriotic motives. The White House, and Ari Fleischer, of course, are trying to say he didn't have enough access to say what he has said, but of course nobody will admit to having read the book yet. So far I haven't seen a convincing refutation of any of the facts or incidents he's written about.

If he's right that Bush's impulses from an early date were more Wilsonian than defensive -- that he wanted to attack Iraq to impose "coercive democracy" (nice turn of phrase) more than because the intelligence was so supposedly airtight on WMD, it's an important thing to know. It would mean that Bush is an even bigger fool than we thought.

Iraq: No strategy but holding on

Here's a link to the Register's editorial on the appearances before Congress of Gen. David Petraeus and Ambassador Cooper on Tuesday. What he had to say and what Bush said today reinforces my impression that Bush simply intends to hang on until the end of the term and hand the mess over to the next president. I'm almost cynical enough to think he and the neocons have already prepared their rationale for future propaganda: We had Iraq in hand and victory just around the corner and those Democrats (or even McCain; these people are utterly without personal honor in my view) messed it up.

McCain the warlike

Here's a link to my latest piece for Antiwar.com, a review of Matt Welch's excellent recent book, "McCain: The Myth of a Maverick." The book cuts through the heroic history and the media's love affair with with the 2000 Straight Talk Express to check out what McCain really thinks and what kinds of policies move him. The bottom line is that what his philosophy has evolved into is "national greatness" nationalism as expressed mostly through military action. He could be, if elected, the most militaristic president we've had in decades. He missed a chance to distance himself from Bush and identify with Petraeus on his recent trip when Petraeus talked about the lack of Iraqi government progress toward reconciliation. He could have talked nicely but tough to Maliki, but he seems so in love with the idea of the Iraq war that he doesn't seem to have thought of it.

And on the domestic side, he's about as far from a conservative, let alone a free-market advocate, as one can get. Add the legendary temper and possible instability, something he's displayed ever since he was a kid. He strikes me as actively hostile to liberty and a fairly complete disaster.

Ahmadinejad in Baghdad

The visit to Iraq by Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad highlights yet another bit of blowback from the Iraq war. I did a piece before the war that sketched Mesopotamian history and explained the ethnic/religious landscape, noting that the majority Shia had an affinity for and connections with Iran. Shortly thereafter any number of commentators noted that one impact of removing Saddam Hussein, Iran's mortal enemy, from power, was to increase the regional power and influence of Iran.

I don't think it's helpful to analysis to label certain regimes as "devil states." Every government has more than a bit of the devil in it. The Iranian regime is much more complicated than simply being an anti-American machine. But if one is concerned about Iran's growing regional influence, as is not unseemly, one would have hoped somebody among the geniuses touting war with Iraq in 2002 would have considered the likely impact of enhancing Iran's influence and power.

Dog over a cliff

Curious priorities we Americans have. The local L.A. news tonight (ABC affiliate) led with excerpts from this disturbing video of a couple of U.S. servicemen throwing a little puppy over a cliff (don't watch it if you're sqeamish about sudden puppy death). Not that I would minimize the needless cruelty here, but all the needless cruelty to human beings during the Iraq war doesn't seem to have inspired anything like such attention and outrage.

War, an enterprise that has as its purpose killing human beings, is an inherently coarsening activity. Should it surprise anybody that people who have killed others and seen their buddies die might get a bit casual about the value of life, perhaps even joking and lautghing about it?

Reasons for caution in Iraq

Here's a link to the Register's editorial today critiquing Bush's characterization of the situation in Iraq in his State of the Union message. We conceded the decline in violence and reasons to feel more optimistic than in past years, but noted several potential problems.

The "Anbar Awakening" preceded the surge and could be transient, especially if the Sunni militias fighting al-Qaida and patrolling meighborhoods aren't integrated somehow in the Shia-dominated national government's security forces. Muqtada al-Sadr is getting pressure to end the cease-fire he imposed on his Mahdi Army last summer. And the Iraqi government has taken maybe 3 of the 18 steps defined as essential benchmarks a year or more ago. Even the de-Baathification program looks like less than meets the eye.

I ran across a WaPo piece today that suggests other reasons to be pessimistic. According to Thomas Ricks, Army commanders in Iraq see three wars going on or worth worrying about. One against al-Qaida in Iraq, two against the domestic Sunni insurgency, and "the third conflict, and perhaps the most vexing for U.S. commanders, is with Shiite extremist militias. All three enemies adapt quickly to changed U.S. tactics, finding ways to adapt and keep stirring things up, as by switching from car bombs to suicide bombers when better cvheckpoints made car bombs less easy to detonate.

It's hard enough to win against one insurgency when you're a foreign occupying power. Handling three at once won't be easy.

Pleading for some substance

Here's a link to the article I did last week for Antiwar.com, deploring the fact that the war has receded to such an extent as a live issue in the presidential campaign. I'm frankly not sure just what to do about it. The Democrats seem to get all they need on the issue by criticizing the war and Bush and not going into much detail beyond that. And the Republlicans (except for Ron Paul, of course) vie to top one another in bellicosity. They need an incentive to do much more than that, but the political landscape has tilted toward domestic concerns.

Blowback in Algeria

Here's a link to the Register's editorial arguing that the two bombings last week in Algiers, at the UN compound and Algeria's Supreme Court -- really nasty ones, with most news accounts counting the deaths in the 70s -- are to some extent "blowback" from the American invasion of Iraq. A number of news stories in the last few months, including some referenced in this blog, have told of jihadists in Algeria and Morocco traveling to Iraq to participate in the insurrection. Jihadists in Iraq get much more valuable experience in a real war than bin Laden's troops could ever get in those fabled training camps in Afghanistan. Terrorism experts have been worrying for some time that foreign fighters in Iraq will return to their home countries -- Britain, France, Germany and Spain are likely future targets -- to wreak havoc. The two suicide bombers in Algeria apparently didn't travel to Iraq themselves, but authorities are still looking into how they were trained. I'd be amazed if there isn't an Iraqi connection. It's one of the prices the world will be paying for years to come for the invasion of Iraq.

Who lost Turkey?

Now we're getting articles with titles like that, this one from Juan Cole at the University of Michigan. Juan teaches Middle Eastern history and reminds us that Turkey has been a solid American ally since World War II, and was a NATO ally during the Cold War. About 70 prrcent of U.S. supplies for the military people in northern portions of Iraq go through Turkey, mainly the Incirlik air base. And while Turkey has hardly been kind to the Kurds in the country, the establishment of a de facto independent Kurdistan in northern Iraq -- up to now the most stable and hopeful part of the country, has complicated life for the Turkish government, what with cross-border raids by the anti-Turk PKK; the Kurdish rebellion had been fairly quiescent.

On Sunday Kurdish guerrillas killed 13 Turkish troops. There are rumors (and more) the Turks are launching long-range artillery at suspected PKK sites in northern Iraq. And a committee in the House just labeled the mass murder of Armenians a "genocide." A Turkish cross-border incursion with men and equipment would likely destabilize northern Iraq further. Now after dissing Turkey for years, the Bush administration is pleading for restraint.

These troubles with Turkey are yet another unanticipated consequence ("blowback," if you will) of stirring the pot in the Middle East by invading Iraq. Making Iran more influential and powerful and losing a long-time ally. Good work!

Waiting . . . then Blackwater

I don't know whether it's the Register Web site or something with my connection, but I can't get it to display a few more things I want to link to. We'll wait a while.

Meanwhile, the fact that the Iraqi government is still insisting on kicking Blackwater out of the country and having the Blackwater contractors (all right, mercenaries, but there's not necessarily anything wrong with that) be turned over to the Iraqi government for prosecution suggests that hatred of Blackwater is perhaps the only thing that can unite Iraqis. Maybe that's not so bad. I don't know if this is a major turning-point in the war, presaging an Iraqi government ann0ouncement that it wants U.S. troops out by a date certain and the U.S., not really respecting "sovereignty" because it really wants to attack Iran, as Justin Raimondo has suggested. But it's a sign that the widespread Iraqi discontent with the U.S. occupation, of which Blackwater is only the most recent symbol, is starting to find expression in the Iraqi government. Let's hope the U.S.government can recognize it as a good development, but I fear it won't.