Obama's sorry speech

I'll know it's almost time to retire when a situation like last night doesn't get the adrenaline flowing and stir the creative juices. Obama gave his speech at 5:00 PST, and the last train leaves at 6:50, so I had to listen to the speech, check my notes, and write this editorial by about 6:20 to have time for Cathy to read it, ask a few questions, change a few things and get it ready for the next day's paper. It went on the Web site right away, and also onto the FreedomPolitics.com site.

It wasn't that hard to write. We have been urging military disengagement in Afghanistan for at least a year, for reasons we think are sound and that haven't changed much. There is no significant al-Qaida presence in Afghanistan, so the main thing we're accomplishing by keeping troops there is fueling the Taliban insurgency and acting as a crutch for the corrupt and ineffectual Karzai regime. Obama's "surge" (greater in percentage terms than Bush's 2007 Iraq surge) is unlikely to achieve much of anything for reasons the editorial explains.

In a later posting on the Register's Orange Punch blog, I played with the idea that this might have been as shrewd a course as Obama could have charted given the bad options facing him and assuming he wasn't going to begin an Afghan pull-out or even a military de-emphasis. He's letting the military throw a Hail Mary, giving it 18 months (ior 12 after the build-up is completed) to do serious damage to the Taliban. Then he'lkl be able to say he gave it his best shot (and maybve even cite some signs of progress) and it's time to begin the pull-out. Don't know if that's his game, but if it is it just might be the least-worst of what was feasible.

Of course there's some gross cynicism involved; he's sending X number of Americans to their deaths -- surely the death toll will rise with more troops and m,ore active engagement, unless the Taliban just plays possum, and those people will have died for nothing.

Iraqi election agreement not a bad sign

I've noted elsewhere the irony that just now the U.S., in the form of Ambassador Christopher Hill, has been manically trying to micromanage the parliamentary process ion Iraq to produce the agreement just reached on an election law to govern the elections scheduled for January -- to some extent trying to create or coax along a process that should lead to scheduled troop withdrawals and the eventual abandonment not just of micromanaging but managing Iraq at all. Even now, Hill is less like an overlord and more like a lobbyist; U.S. influence is still pervasive but not necessarily decisive. That's not a bad situation as the Register opined; assuming there's not massive violence during the period surrounding the election (not necessarily an entirely safe assumption) we should have "only" about 50,000 troops in Iraq by next August or so, and virtually none a year after that. I hope it works out that way.

I suspect most Americans see the Iraq war as a disaster from which we were lucky to escape without more lasting damage -- though there are still war enthusiasts out there convinced we acted wisely and are succeeding. It is difficult to understand why so much of the political class works so hard to avoid seeing that further escalation in Afghanistan is likely to be even less satisfactory than Iraq has been. It smells of an empire in decline with a sadly out-of-touch aristocracy in charge. It's just sad so many decent Americans in the military will have to be sacrificed to the delusions of old men.

Can the U.S. accept a victory?

I would like to hope that this article in the WaPo represents a possible administration trial balloon or preparation for significantly reducing the military footprint of the U.S. in Afghanistan and perhaps Pakistan as well. Karen De Young and Walter Pincus (one of the people in the world I'm glad I took the initiative to meet) provide information, largely overlooked, to my knowledge, that certainly could provide a rationale for such a sensible step.

The word from the intelligence officials they interviewed is that various techniques -- "improved recruitment of spies inside the al-Qaeda network, along with the increased use of targeted airstrikes and enhanced assistance from cooperative governments, has significantly reduced the terrorists organization's effectiveness." Indeed, "Officials described Osama bin Laden and his main lieutenants as isolated and unable to coordinate high-profile attacks."

This jibes with what Stratfor.com and some other intelligence-oriented outfits (and I) have been saying for years -- that al-Qaeda Central, so to speak, has been seriously degraded. It doesn't seem to have had a hand, let alone a coordinating role, in attacks such the Madrid and London train bombings and other attacks. It no doubt has some value to the terrorist cause as an inspirer of would-be terrorists or as a label for already-existing local groups to assume. But it has little operational ability.

Well, isn't that what the U.S. has said is the central goal -- disabling al-Qaeda? It seems to have been largely accomplished (though continued vigilance is no doubt warranted), and not through conventional military means or classic counterinsurgency methods, but through a combination of intelligence, which helped to identify drone targets with increasing effectiveness, collaboration with others, and police-like work. How a classic counterinsurgency campaign that would first have to legitimize the pathetic Karzai regime, in Afghanistan would contribute to further success is unclear, to say the least. By extending the unpopular de facto U.S. occupation of Afghanistan, it might even aid terrorist recruitment.

I hate to think that the U.S. has evolved into a regime that must have constant wars, regimes designated as pariahs to justify constant hostility, and leaders inflating threats to justify its military-industrial establishment. But if we can't accept victory over al-Qaeda, or at least decide to keep doing what's working and abandon the military-centered actions that aren't, one wonders.

McChrystal's blueprint for nation-building

I cross-posted this to the Orange County Register's Orange Punch blog, but I thought it was important enough to put up wherever I had access. Stanley McChrystal's plan for Afghanistan is almost breathtaking in its nation-building ambition, and apparently leaked by the Pentagon it has apparently caused some consternation at the White House:

I have finished reading Afghan Gen.-in-charge Stanley McChrystal’s “assessment” on the Afghan war and am somewhat blown away by how thoroughly nation-building it is. I probably shouldn’t be surprised. McChrystal was chosen because he’s supposed to be an expert on counterinsurgency, and this assessment basically consists of plugging what can be garnered from the facts on the ground into classic counterinsurgency doctrine. The trouble is that while the doctrine is well-established among military intellectuals (if that isn’t an oxymoron) it has hardly ever worked in the real world. Basically, it involves winning the “hearts and minds” of the populace first by protecting them and offering economic development (roads, infrastructure projects, etc.) and effective, credible governance, thus neutralizing the appeal of the insurgents — as opposed to seeking out and killing the insurgents. The traditional doctrine, however, dictates force levels that would transfer to something like 500,000 foreign troops in Afghanistan (there are 68,000 now) and at least 10 years of patient nation-building.

Herewith a few key excerpts:

“To execute the strategy we must grow and improve the effectiveness of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and elevate the importance of governance.”

“Our strategy cannot be focused on seizing terrain or destroying ninsurgent forces; our objective must be the population.” [an admission that neither the government nor the coalition forces "have" the population now]

“the objective is the will of the people, our conventional warfare culture is part of the problem”

“resources will not win this war, but under-resourcing could lose it.”

“the international community must provide substantial assistance to Afghanistan until the ASfghan people make the decision to support their government and are capable of providing for their own security.”

“The second threat [the first is the existence of the insurgency] … is the crisi8s of popular confidence that springs from the weakness of GIRoA [Afghan govt.] institutions, the unpunished abuse of power by corrupt officials and power brokers, a widespread sense of political disenfranchisement, and a longstanding lack of economic opportunity.” In McChrystal’s view, the US must fix all this — good luck — for success to be achieved.

“There are no clear lines separating insurgent groups, criminal networks (including the narcotics networks) and corrupt GIRoA officials. Malign actors within GIRoA support insurgent groups directly, support criminal networks that are linked to insurgents, and support corruption that helps feed the insurgency.”“Hard-earned credibility and face-to-face relationships, rather than close combat, will achieve success. This requires enabling Afghan counterparts to meet the needs of the people at the community level thrugh dynamic partnership, engaged leadership, de-centralized decisin-making, and a fundamental shift in priorities.

“Success will be achieved when GIRoA has earned the support of the powerful Aghan people and effectively controls its own territory. This will not come easily or quickly. It is realistic to expect that Afghan and coalition casualties will increase until GIRoA and ISAF [international forces] regain the initiative.”

“GIRoA cannot fund its operations because of its inability to raise revenue, a situation made worse by the illicit economy. Poorly paid officials may resort to petty corruption, contributing to the peoples’ crisis in confidence. The international community [us taxpayers] must appropriately supplerment revenues until these problems are addressed.” The fact that foreign aid usually increases corruption rather than reduces it isn’t addressed.

And so on. It’s a heck of commitment. No wonder Obama is trying to buy time before he makes a decision. I’m guessing it will be a commitment to 2-3 years to make Obama appear serious before starting to withdrawal. If McChrystal is right, that’s just a half-hearted commitment enough to guarantee failure, with serious loss of U.S. lives and treasure.